

Office of the MTA Inspector General

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Message from the Inspector General

conversations with a

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including subway

line superintendents,

track workers, railroad

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and escalator personnel,

subway and bus

operators, and a public

address announcer for

the A/C line.

Trust.

It is essential for running a transportation system as vast as the MTA and crucial for providing effective oversight.

When trust in the system erodes, riders feel less safe, worker morale drops, and public perception becomes excessively negative.

And I believe the work of my office is critical to earning that trust.

We help improve public trust in the system through our meticulous audits and investigations, which aim to make the MTA safer, more efficient, and less burdened by fraudulent and wasteful practices.

Take our audit of the NYC Subway's emergency exit infrastructure as an example.

The report included concerning findings about obstructed exit pathways, dangerous structural issues, and a lack of lighting. And this is not a theoretical threat, as only a week before we released our report, thousands of riders were forced to evacuate through subway tunnels due to a power failure. I joined the audit team on some of the site visits in the tunnels and saw for myself the potential hazards to fleeing riders.

We were accompanied by various NYC Transit employees who worked with us to cure immediate hazards. As so often happens, the workers took pride in improving conditions we brought to their attention.

To effectively oversee MTA operations, my office

needs to gain the trust of MTA employees, which can be a challenge, but it is vital to make sure misconduct, unsafe conditions, waste, and other issues get reported.

We earn that trust through our frequent visits to MTA facilities, where we explain the role of my office, listen to employee concerns, and encourage them to reach out to us so we can address those issues wherever possible.

In 2024, I had productive conversations with a wide array of employees, including subway line superintendents, track workers, railroad conductors, control tower operators, train car mechanics, elevator and escalator personnel, subway and bus operators, and a public address announcer for the A/C line.

Some of them asked tough questions. Some did not know if they could trust my office. And that's okay. That trust needs to be earned.

But my messaging is consistent: we are allies, not adversaries.

Beyond our outreach efforts, I am exceptionally proud of the reports my office produced last year and the important, meaningful recommendations we made to the MTA.

Our investigations tackled egregious time abuse, dual employment, GPS tampering, fake Covid vaccination cards, and a review of the MTA Police Department's Internal Affairs Bureau.

On the audit side, beyond the emergency exit report, we issued a report that revealed misuse and mismanagement of the Help Point system. The Audit unit also revealed major fire safety issues at a NYC Transit building, lapses in MTA vehicle usage oversight, and potential misuse of reduced-fare MetroCards.

Now, as we look ahead to 2025 and beyond, we must follow up on that great work and make sure we have the capacity to do so.

We will continue to strengthen our Data Analytics and Research Team so it can better assist with ongoing investigations and audits. Data is everywhere at the MTA, and it also holds huge potential for proactive investigations and audits. I want my team to sift through the mountains of data the MTA has, look for red flags, and spot issues before they become bigger problems.

My other top priority is to bolster our construction oversight group — a collaboration of our audit and investigative teams with oversight of MTA capital projects big and small — so that we can provide comprehensive review of this work.

As we look to the future of this office and to our area's transportation system, my message to the public and to the MTA workforce is that we are steadfastly focused on improving the MTA, its operations, its efficiency, and its safety.

We will be relentless in fulfilling that mission.








VAV 3

(Clockwise from top left) Inspector General Cort touring the 7 line, at Kingsbridge Bus Depot, visiting the A/C lines, at Cozine Iron Shop, at the Rail Control Center, and visiting East New York Bus Depot.







The Office of the MTA Inspector General's (OIG) audits, investigations, recommendations dashboard, and press releases are available at https://MTAIG.ny.gov.

Announcements of the latest reports, multimedia, and news from OIG are also available on OIG's social media accounts: X, Instagram: @MTAOIG LinkedIn: @MTA Inspector General


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2024 Statistical Highlights




OIG Issued 18 Reports in 2024

12 Investigative | 6 Audits




OIG Issued 68 Recommendations in 2024*




*Does not include 28 recommendations that were included in the 2023 Annual Report

Total Number of Complaints




*Since 2023, OIG has seen a significant rise in service-related customer complaints, particularly regarding buses and subways. In September 2024, OIG improved its system for logging those complaints, which reduced the total entries into our case management system by 1,722.

Complaints by Source



Members of the Public	3,042	73.7%
Anonymous	772	18.7%
MTA Employee / Former Employee	261	6.3%
Other Governmental Agency	20	0.5%
Other	32	0.8%
Total Complaints	4,127	100.0%

Complaints Disposition and Resolution




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0.1%

Other

2024 Site Visits

OIG's Investigative, Audit, and Executive units conducted 419 site visits.







NYC Transit Subway Emergency Exits: Significant Work is Needed to Reach and Maintain a State of Good Repair

OIG conducted an extensive audit of the subway system's emergency exits, given their impact on passenger and worker safety, and concluded that a significant number could not be navigated safely due to their serious state of disrepair or other factors, such as obstructions.

OIG auditors encountered tripping hazards, obstructions, inadequate or nonexistent lighting, exposed wiring, loose or broken handrails, corrosion, and other unsafe conditions during visits to emergency exit locations, underground tunnels, under-river tubes, segments of elevated track, and a portion of the Staten Island Railway.

The examination also revealed significant lapses in NYC Transit's inspection, maintenance, and repair procedures related to these facilities, where employees and contractors work daily, in addition to their potential use in emergency situations.

Among the audit's findings:

• Of the 163 total assets OIG evaluated across 106 locations, 41% had moderate to severe defects that required repair either immediately or in the near term. Of the 65 emergency exit stairwells assessed, 54% had serious defects.


• Subway emergency exits had an array of hazards, including structural defects and poor drainage and water intrusion causing corrosion and other damage.



• In some exit stairways, there was inadequate or no lighting at all and filthy or broken fixtures. In several instances, OIG and NYC Transit personnel had to navigate by flashlight.

• Portions of the walkways known as bench walls running along the sides of the underground tunnels and tubes were uneven, cracked, and in some locations separating from the tunnel walls. Several had been fitted with metal straps for support.

• Along elevated tracks, OIG observed many loose or broken handrails, with some deficient handrails stretching more than 100 feet.





• The quality of NYC Transit's inspections needs improvement. Only 13% of the serious defects identified by OIG in exit stairwells had been previously noted by inspectors.

• Approximately 76% of the serious defects reported by NYC Transit inspectors were not responded to by repair crews within the 90-day period required by agency policy.

• Subway emergency exits located in an LIRR yard, inside a Con Edison facility, and along tunnels connected to the new Grand Central Madison terminal had not been managed in a coordinated fashion.



OIG made 24 recommendations to NYC Transit and two to MTA Construction & Development (C&D) to resolve some of the most glaring issues, including ways to improve the quality of inspections, the timeliness of repairs, and the condition of emergency exit lighting and electrical systems. NYC Transit accepted nine recommendations, while rejecting the remaining 15 for a variety of reasons, ranging from disagreement with what was proposed to claiming that current policies and procedures were sufficient to resolve OIG's concerns. The two recommendations to C&D were deemed accepted.

On February 2, 2024, as part of this same audit, OIG sent a letter to LIRR regarding two subway emergency exits on its property. LIRR had erected a chain-link fence too close to the hatch openings, and a significant amount of stored equipment and material obstructed an exit pathway. LIRR accepted all four recommendations and said it has addressed the issues.



NYC Transit Can be More Responsive to Help Point Calls by Improving Operations

An OIG review of NYC Transit's "Help Point" intercom system — a network of 3,016 intercoms across all 472 stations that allow the public to report an emergency or request information — found that, while call volumes were high, approximately 50% were labeled as "mischief." Additionally, 1,198 emergency calls went unanswered, and many calls experienced delays before they were answered. The audit also found NYC Transit did not prioritize emergency calls over information calls.

OIG's audit covered all Help Point calls made from May 2023 through October 2023. Of the 140,698 total calls during that period, just 28% were from customers in need of assistance. Another 22% were calls made by agency personnel testing the system. For the emergency calls it did handle, the agency answered only 75% of them within 15 seconds — a lower rate than the 90% standard for 911 call centers and lower than the agency's stated goal of answering all calls immediately.

OIG identified several causes for unanswered calls and delays in answering calls, including a technical glitch, a lack of policies and procedures (which MTA auditors recommended addressing in 2016), staffing level fluctuations, and the absence of accurate and timely data for managers to assess the performance of the call center and its operators.

OIG recommended prioritizing emergency calls, reducing unnecessary call traffic, and improving overall call management and oversight. NYC Transit accepted all nine of OIG's recommendations.

Fire Safety Controls Ignored by Contractor at 130 Livingston Street

An OIG audit uncovered serious, potentially deadly fire safety lapses by a contractor during electrical and mechanical upgrades at NYC Transit's 130 Livingston Street building in Brooklyn. The audit, prompted by 44 fire safety trouble alarms between March 24 and March 30, 2023, revealed that the contractor disabled fire alarm devices without notifying building management or implementing required safety measures, such as fire watches. The contractor bypassed safety protocols by working without proper supervision.

The audit identified oversight failures by the C&D construction management staff, who were unaware of the fire alarm work being performed. The Fire Safety Director contract also lacked clarity on fire safety roles, leading to \$35,000 in unnecessary fire watch costs paid by the MTA.

OIG recommended that the MTA hold the contractor accountable for the \$35,000 fire watch costs, enforce stricter safety provisions, and update contracts to define fire safety expectations clearly. In response, the MTA took decisive action and implemented all of OIG's recommendations.



KENNETH GRANT/NEWYORKITECTURE.COM

MNR, LIRR, and NYC Transit Should Improve Oversight of Vehicle Usage

OIG published three audit reports in 2024 related to the oversight of highway vehicle usage at LIRR, NYC Transit, and MNR that described concerns about excessive idling and risky driving behaviors. The audits, which followed up on previous LIRR and MNR reports from 2018 and 2012, respectively, found that while some improvements had been made, significant issues remained.

OIG conducted separate audits of each agency's data on employee vehicle usage, as captured in an Automatic Vehicle Location Monitoring system called FleetTrack. OIG's analyses included two safety-related indicators, harsh braking and harsh acceleration. Auditors concluded that management should identify employees who repeatedly showed above-average levels of these behaviors, improve the quality of its data on speeding, and take action to reduce excessively risky driving habits.

In addition to safety indicators, the audit also looked at excessive idling. At each agency, OIG found that certain employees appeared to engage in excessive idling in agency vehicles during work hours. Excessive idling for the purpose of these audits was defined as an engine running for periods of five minutes or more while stopped. Audit recommendations directed the agencies to monitor idling more closely and take action to curb the length and frequency of vehicle idling.

Specific findings for each agency are as follows:

The OIG review at LIRR determined that two recommendations from the 2018 audit had not been fully addressed. First, the agency's revised policies still did not sufficiently define the duties required of executives, the Vehicle Fleet Office, and the operating departments' Vehicle Coordinators in monitoring idling. Second, LIRR had not developed goals and metrics to allow the agency to track its progress in reducing unnecessary idling. The 2024 LIRR audit data revealed that vehicles idled for an average of 19% of the time their engines were running. The NYC Transit audit revealed that no one at the agency was monitoring driver behavior. OIG found a lack of monitoring protocols or other controls over employees' vehicle usage. Out of 417 vehicles, 269 idled excessively for a combined total of over 5,000 hours during a two-week sample in 2023. OIG found that unlike MNR and LIRR, NYC Transit did not require drivers to swipe or tap an identification card before driving an agency vehicle, and that was because the agency did not have the technology to do so. Instead, agency personnel referred to paper mileage logs to determine who had driven a vehicle at a given time.

In the case of MNR, OIG found that while oversight had improved following the two prior audits into excessive idling, the vehicles included in the review were still found to idle excessively 23% of the time their engines were running. Concerning levels of risky driving persisted at the agency. The audit found that MNR also needed to better utilize FleetTrack data and technology for monitoring.

MNR, LIRR, and NYC Transit accepted all of OIG's recommendations in the audits and have begun implementation.





Potential Misuse of Discounted MetroCards

An OIG audit revealed potential misuse of discounted MetroCards provided by NYC Transit's Reduced-Fare program and the NYC Human Resources Administration's (HRA) Fair Fares program. While both programs offer 50% fare discounts to eligible individuals, some customers qualify for and may obtain MetroCards from both programs, raising concerns about potential fraud.

The audit found that out of the approximately 1.8 million combined program participants, 328 customers possessed and used both discounted MetroCards on the same or alternating days, indicating a risk of misuse. Because every Reduced-Fare MetroCard includes a photo of the customer, it is more difficult to sell or share. In contrast, the Fair Fares MetroCard, which is paid for by HRA and does not have a photo, is more likely to be misused.

OIG recommended that NYC Transit collaborate with HRA to cancel or not renew one of the discounted MetroCards for the identified customers. Additionally, OIG advised developing fraud prevention strategies as both programs transition to the OMNY payment system, ensuring proper controls are in place and data is shared as needed to continue serving these communities and limiting the misuse of discounted MetroCards. NYC Transit has acknowledged the findings and is working with HRA to address the issue and implement necessary controls.





LIRR Gang Foreman Used Duplicate Card to Skip Shifts, Lied Under Oath and Submitted Fake Email to OIG to Cover Tracks

OIG issued two investigative reports regarding a Gang Foreman who obtained a fake LIRR identification and access card that his coworkers used to swipe him in and out of the timekeeping system when he was not actually at work and who then attempted to cover up his deception.

OIG received an anonymous complaint in October 2022 that the Gang Foreman was stealing time and that a colleague had been swiping him in with an unauthorized, duplicate LIRR card. The ensuing investigation revealed that he had unauthorized absences on 14 dates between November 1, 2022, and January 24, 2023. Physical and video surveillance showed that he arrived late to work, left early before his shift ended, or left his work location for several hours during his shift. On nine of those 14 dates, OIG found fraudulent swipes of his access card at the beginning or end of his shift that made it appear as though he had worked a complete shift.

The Gang Foreman admitted to OIG that he obtained an unauthorized duplicate LIRR card and that his colleagues used either the fake cloned card or his real card to swipe him in and out when he was off property. He received compensation for more than 49 regular and overtime hours to which he was not entitled.

During the investigation, OIG discovered that the Gang Foreman had fabricated an email to his supervisors attempting to justify his absences to the OIG. He then produced this email to OIG and lied about it under oath at an OIG proceeding.

The Gang Foreman resigned while disciplinary proceedings were pending and LIRR sought to recoup \$3,196 to cover the fraudulent hours for which he was paid.



Two Supervisors Fired, Another Disciplined Over Computer Specialist's Unauthorized College Teaching Job on MTA Time

An OIG investigation found that an MTA Computer Specialist spent at least four years working an unauthorized, second job as an adjunct professor during her regular work hours without her supervisors discovering her dual employment. Additionally, the Computer Specialist used MTA equipment and email for her teaching job in violation of MTA policies and rules.

The investigation was prompted by complaints from a fellow MTA employee that the Computer Specialist was making unauthorized phone calls on her MTA cell phone and performing unauthorized remote work during overseas vacations in violation of multiple MTA policies.


OIG confirmed that the Computer Specialist, who was not eligible for remote work, used her MTA-issued cell phone and other equipment overseas for both personal and MTA business. However, two of her supervisors required the Computer Specialist to telework during her scheduled vacation time due to their own failure to ensure an appropriately trained back-up was available to perform her tasks.

After investigating the initial allegations, investigators discovered the Computer Specialist's unauthorized second job as an adjunct professor.

She taught a combination of in-person and remote classes between Spring 2020 and Fall 2023. Most of those classes were scheduled during her MTA work hours, and some were taught remotely using her MTA-issued computer.

On June 25, 2024, the Computer Specialist was suspended for 30 days without pay.

Two of her supervisors were terminated and the third received a written warning. OIG also referred this matter to the New York State Commission on Ethics and Lobbying in Government.



MNR Supervisor Misused Work Vehicle and Tampered with Vehicle GPS Device

OIG found that an MNR supervisor disabled the GPS device on his work vehicle more than 100 times in an 8-month period and also used the truck to run personal errands. The MNR employee, a Structures Supervisor based out of the MTA yard at Bridgeport, Connecticut, admitted to the misconduct and resigned in lieu of termination following OIG's investigation.

OIG's investigation began in July 2023 with a referral from MNR's Security Department. After noticing frequent GPS device disconnections and inspecting his vehicle, MNR suspected that the supervisor repeatedly tampered with the vehicle's GPS device. OIG found that the GPS device had been disconnected at least 111 times between July 15, 2023 and March 18, 2024.

A review of the truck's GPS device data revealed:

18 instances when the device was disconnected and re-connected on the same day;

60 overnight disconnections when the device was disconnected in the afternoon or evening and reconnected the following day; and

instances when the device was disconnected for consecutive days, including over the Thanksgiving, Christmas, and New Year's holiday weekends.

OIG installed a second, hidden GPS device in the supervisor's truck and found that he used the vehicle for personal business while off duty on 40 of 57 days reviewed. He also used the vehicle while on duty to run personal errands on extended breaks from work, for which he did not take any leave.

MNR suspended the supervisor without pay prior to his resignation and sought to recoup compensation paid for hours he did not work.





OIG Review of an MTA Police Department Internal Affairs Bureau Investigation

The Chief of the MTA Police Department (MTAPD) requested that OIG conduct a review of a closed Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB) investigation following a complaint from an MTAPD officer. OIG's ensuing examination resulted in 10 recommendations, including how IAB should refocus its investigative mission related to training and staffing so IAB could better handle high level allegations and establish clear disciplinary guidelines to standardize charges and punishments. MTAPD accepted all of OIG recommendations.

The closed IAB investigation prompting OIG's review stemmed from allegations against MTA police officers of assault and other misconduct at Penn Station in January 2020. The claims led to



discipline for some of the officers, which was later overturned by an arbitrator, who found a lack of evidence to support the allegations and no basis to discipline the officers.

In February 2023, one of the MTA police officers who had been disciplined made a complaint to the MTAPD Chief about the IAB investigation. The Chief asked OIG to assess the quality of the closed investigation and, if needed, to make recommendations to improve IAB practices and procedures.

OIG's review, which did not include a re-examination of the original allegations against the officers, found no intentional wrongdoing by IAB staff but revealed several critical issues within IAB.

OIG's recommendations included that IAB should:

Refocus its investigative mission to shift low-level offenses out of IAB's purview so that it can focus on serious allegations.

Develop a comprehensive training and staffing plan for IAB personnel, including reevaluating how long an officer can spend in IAB and assessing the number of investigators assigned to IAB.

Establish clear guidelines for conducting investigations and making timely criminal referrals.

Formalize disciplinary processes to standardize punishments for departmental charges.

NYC Transit Supervisor and His Female Subordinate Repeatedly Left Worksite Together at Night Without Permission

OIG substantiated allegations that a NYC Transit Maintenance Supervisor Level II (MS II) and his subordinate Trackworker, who both admitted they were previously in a romantic relationship with each other, repeatedly left their DeKalb Ave Station worksite together for many hours without permission during overnight shifts.

OIG observed them together during five of six overnight shifts, sitting in one of their private vehicles on a secluded street or running personal errands.



OIG found the MS II violated NYC Transit policies and also failed to properly supervise the Trackworker when he permitted her to violate policies. The MS II also used his position as a Maintenance Supervisor Level II and his ability to control the Trackworker's schedule to ensure that they worked certain shifts together, enabling them to spend on-duty time together off NYC Transit property.

In addition, OIG found that the MS II and the Trackworker used their personal vehicles to drive to NYC Transit job sites, which was not permitted.

OIG recommended that NYC Transit take whatever action it deemed appropriate.

Following separate arbitration hearings concerning disciplinary charges, an arbitrator found the MS II's misconduct was a breach of supervisory responsibilities and imposed a penalty of demotion, while another arbitrator imposed a penalty of a time-served suspension for the Trackworker. OIG found the MS II violated NYC Transit policies and also failed to properly supervise the Trackworker when he permitted her to violate policies.



The NYC Transit workers repeatedly left their worksite (left) and were seen parked for hours on a secluded street (above).

Improper Time and Record Keeping by a NYC Transit Bus Operator Union Chairman

OIG found that a NYC Transit Bus Operator, also the Union Chairman at Flatbush Bus Depot, received overtime, paid at time and a half, for at least seven extra shifts he either did not work in whole or in part. The investigation also found insufficient oversight by the General Superintendent of Transportation at the depot.

OIG's investigation began in late 2022 following a complaint that the Chairman was not showing up for the "5:00 a.m. extra," an overtime shift he was assigned to work prior to his regular tour. The investigation included surveillance of the Chairman's residence and found that on seven dates he arrived at the Depot either late for the extra shift or missed it entirely. The extra shifts are granted to all union chairmen of Buses, who are not required to use the Kronos system to clock their time.

NYC Transit accepted all of OIG's recommendations for improved timekeeping protocols and retraining of supervisors, including requiring union chairmen and vice chairmen to swipe in and out when reporting for work within their title and training the depot's former and current General Superintendents of Transportation about proper time keeping and attendance review.

The Chairman, who was hired by NYC Transit in March 1999, filed for retirement in January 2024 while under OIG investigation, and left the agency before the matter could be heard at arbitration.



Submission of Fake COVID-19 Vaccination Cards by Two NYC Transit Employees

OIG investigated allegations that two NYC Transit employees, a husband and wife, submitted fake COVID-19 vaccination cards to the MTA as proof of vaccination. OIG found that the vaccination cards the employees submitted to the MTA in December 2021 contained falsified information. Both employees admitted to OIG that they submitted fake cards to the MTA as proof of vaccination and were not vaccinated, which OIG determined was in violation of the MTA's COVID-19 Vaccine or Test Program, the MTA Code of Ethics, and NYC Transit Rules.

NYC Transit administratively charged both employees on January 26, 2024, and placed them on pre-disciplinary, unpaid suspension. One of the employees, a Transit Property Protection Agent, resigned while on unpaid suspension, and NYC Transit administratively closed the disciplinary action. His wife, a Transit Station Agent, accepted a 30-day unpaid suspension and a final warning.



MTA Employees' Submission of Falsified COVID-19 Vaccination Cards

An OIG investigation revealed that 12 MTA employees submitted fraudulent COVID-19 vaccination cards obtained from a clinic operated by a nurse who was later convicted of running a fake vaccination card scheme. One MNR employee was terminated and 11 LIRR employees were suspended. The LIRR workers signed settlement agreements admitting to submitting false documents and violating MTA's COVID-19 Vaccine or Test Program.

The investigation began in 2022 following the arrest of the nurse. OIG interviewed the 12 employees who were ultimately disciplined. These employees, some of whom made admissions, provided various accounts to OIG:

of the 11 LIRR employees admitted to not getting vaccinated and paying for fake vaccination cards.

- 7 employees six from LIRR and one from MNR claimed that they got vaccinated and paid a fee for a homeopathic, "detox treatment." OIG found their accounts "illogical and not credible."
- LIRR employee claimed he got vaccinated at the clinic and did not pay anything. That account, which was contradicted by financial records, was found not to be credible.

In response to OIG's report, MNR terminated one employee in January 2024. LIRR charged the 11 other employees that same month and removed them from service. Between February and April 2024, they each agreed to serve unpaid suspensions ranging from 60 to 120 days.


MTA Bus Company Maintainer Dual Employment

An OIG investigation revealed that an MTA Bus Company Bus Maintainer had an unauthorized second job with a tour bus company and accrued more than 600 hours of overlapping time, of which more than half was billed as overtime to the MTA. The Bus Maintainer had been working the second job without permission since 2018. OIG found that he violated federally-mandated rest periods and used MTA vehicles to commute to the private bus company.

On 206 dates between April 2020 and May 2023, the Bus Maintainer clocked in for overlapping hours at the Baisley Park Depot and the tour bus company, amounting to approximately 298 hours of regular time and approximately 369 hours of overtime. On all 206 dates, he biometrically clocked in, out, or did both (via fingerprint scan) at the tour bus company. The simultaneous shifts violated the federallymandated, eight-hour rest period between shifts for his safety-sensitive position with the MTA.

Records showed that the Bus Maintainer used MTA road trucks to travel to the private tour bus company on some of the dates with overlapping time.

The Bus Maintainer, who admitted to OIG that he had worked the second job without permission since 2018, was terminated effective February 29, 2024, following an arbitration hearing.



Time and Attendance Abuse at Baisley Park Depot

OIG found that a Surface Transit Dispatcher at NYC Transit's Baisley Park Bus Depot in the Unified Timekeeping Unit committed time and attendance abuse. The Dispatcher left his shifts early on multiple occasions without proper authorization, falsified sign-in sheets, and intentionally failed to swipe out in the Kronos timekeeping system at the end of his shift as required.

The investigation further found that the Dispatcher's supervisor, the Director of the unit, did not adequately review the unit's timekeeping records and was unaware that the Dispatcher carved time off the ends of his shifts.


The Director told OIG that he relied on the honor system for time reporting and did not review Kronos swipe data prior to approving the dispatchers' time. OIG recommended that NYC Transit recoup any unearned payments and leave time from the Dispatcher, implement better oversight controls to ensure accurate timekeeping, and review records for other dispatchers in the Unified Timekeeping Unit to identify any possible time and pay discrepancies.

NYC Transit agreed with all three recommendations and was able to recoup a leave balance equal to six vacation days from the Dispatcher.

The Dispatcher had been employed by NYC Transit since 1996 and filed for retirement four days after OIG submitted its report to NYC Transit. His supervisor was "re-instructed" and new oversight controls are now in place, according to NYC Transit.







In addition to the work that leads to reports published on our website, OIG's Audit and Legal & Investigative teams make referrals to the MTA and also facilitate criminal investigations.

Examples from 2024 include:

Bus parts supplier CBM, an MTA vendor, admitted to defrauding U.S. transit authorities by making false statements about the origin of its parts. CBM agreed to pay forfeiture, a fine, and make restitution payments, including one to NYC Transit for \$834,607.64. OIG investigated this matter with the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York and the U.S. Department of Transportation.

• OIG found that an MTA Construction & Development (C&D) vice president was involved in unapproved outside work, receiving rental income via a property management company. The vice president also worked as a university lecturer without MTA approval. These findings were referred to the MTA.

• OIG investigated a complaint that a Metro-North rail car inspector was leaving his New Haven job site for hours at a time while on the clock. Investigators observed him return to his residence twice during shifts for significantly longer than his allotted break time and reviewed swipe data and surveillance video that showed further instances of him leaving the property. The car inspector accepted a 45-day suspension. • OIG substantiated a claim that a former MTA Information Technology employee accepted post-retirement employment with an MTA vendor whose contract he managed. OIG referred the retired employee to the New York State Commission on Ethics and Lobbying in Government because there was evidence that he began negotiating postretirement employment without recusing himself from managing that vendor's contract.

Related to the above matter, OIG found that the retired employee and a current MTA employee were asked by the vendor to provide references to another transportation entity. In response to an OIG recommendation, MTA agreed to develop a policy to provide guidance to active employees who receive reference requests from vendors. MTA also accepted and implemented OIG's recommendation to provide specific direction to vendors about how to request references from the MTA.







Task Force on Superstorm Sandy Recovery & Resiliency, Monitoring Construction and Vendor Integrity

In response to a Federal Transit Administration requirement to provide monitors for the projects funded by the \$5.4 billion Superstorm Sandy Recovery Grants, the MTA established a monitoring oversight committee, which includes OIG. There were 16 Sandy projects monitored by the committee in 2024: 13 NYC Transit projects and three LIRR projects. OIG performed the following Sandy monitoring activities:


Conducted 23 background checks of vendors and contractors working on Sandy grant funded projects to assess the integrity of parties contracting with the MTA.

Attended 153 construction progress meetings.

Conducted 25 site visits (either using OIG staff and/or consultants) to observe compliance with contract requirements.

Conducted 16 Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) office visits to assess the current validity of their DBE certifications.

Reviewed 43 change orders that increased project costs by \$7,614,860, to verify that they were clearly and thoroughly documented per MTA policies and procedures.



OIG Consults on Vendor Performance and Integrity

MTA Capital Program Projects

OIG monitors certain capital projects, including the procurement process of the next phase of the Second Avenue subway, which is a \$7.7 billion project. OIG has also been monitoring the large-scale project to repair or replace portions of the Park Avenue Viaduct. OIG assists MTA Vendor Relations staff in a wide range of activities, from reviewing independent private sector inspector general (IPSIG) reports and sharing intelligence regarding "Significant Adverse Information," to attending and participating in responsibility hearings before, during, and after contract award. OIG consults with Vendor Relations on vendors who have Significant Adverse Information to determine if the imposition of an independent monitor is warranted.



At OIG, we are proud of these accomplishments. To keep improving the MTA's operations, we encourage you — whether you're a customer, an MTA employee, an outside contractor, or a vendor — to share with us any concerns related to suspected fraud, waste, abuse, or corruption at the MTA and its agencies. It's an enormous system — thanks for helping us keep an eye on it.

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TO SUBMIT A COMPLAINT: Online: https://MTAIG.ny.gov Phone: 1-800-MTA-IG4U (1-800-682-4448) Email: Complaints@mtaig.org Postal Mail or Walk-Ins: 1 Penn Plaza, 11th Floor New York, NY 10119

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