REVIEW OF JANUARY 4, 2024 SUBWAY INCIDENT: SELF-EVACUATIONS AND PASSENGER COMMUNICATIONS CAN BE BETTER ADDRESSED – FINAL

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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On January 4, 2024, two New York City Transit (NYC Transit) subway trains collided and derailed just north of the 96th Street Station on the 1/2/3 line in Manhattan. As a result of the collision, two other trains became stuck between stations, preventing passengers from promptly and safely exiting the subway. Multiple passengers on these three trains took matters into their own hands and self-evacuated from the trains and onto the tracks. In the aftermath of this event, the Office of the MTA Inspector General (OIG) initiated a review of the extent of self-evacuations from subway trains and the adequacy of the agency's onboard emergency communications to passengers.

OIG studied this incident and other self-evacuation incidents that occurred from 2015 to 2024 to better understand any strategies NYC Transit has in place to discourage this behavior. OIG also examined the agency's policies and procedures concerning the information given to customers onboard trains during delays and safety events.

A. Summary of Findings

- **Passengers are self-evacuating, thereby endangering themselves and significantly impacting operations.** OIG identified 46 incidents involving the self-evacuation of passengers from 2015 to 2024. Not only do passengers risk electrocution or being struck by a moving train, the presence of customers on the roadbed often prevents NYC Transit from promptly evacuating passengers or resuming service.

- **NYC Transit data could inform agency efforts to reduce self-evacuations.** OIG found that NYC Transit could use its train incident data to identify patterns and trends in self-evacuation to inform interventions targeted at reducing the frequency of self-evacuation.

- **The agency can improve train crew announcements during emergencies.** OIG found that train crew members did not always remind passengers to remain on the train during emergencies or warn passengers of the dangers of self-evacuating. Furthermore, most NYC Transit train personnel were not aware of the requirement that a train operator must make passenger announcements when the conductor is unable to do so.

B. Summary of Recommendations

While NYC Transit cannot directly control the behavior of passengers, the agency should consider all ways to reduce the frequency of self-evacuation given the risk to passenger safety and the impact on operations. NYC Transit could make better use of its incident data to monitor self-evacuation patterns. The agency could also initiate a campaign to better raise awareness of the dangers of self-evacuation and encourage passengers not to engage in that dangerous behavior. Additionally, by changing the content of onboard announcements and emphasizing the role of both conductors and train operators in communicating to passengers during delays and emergencies, NYC Transit could help keep passengers better informed. When self-evacuations significantly impact service, NYC Transit should also conduct a lessons-learned review on the nature and frequency of train crew communications with passengers.

C. Summary of Agency Response

In February 2025, OIG shared its Draft Report with NYC Transit for comment. The agency said in its April response that it has accepted four of the six recommendations and is still considering the other two recommendations. The agency committed to finishing its review by later this year. The agency agreed to regularly analyze its train incident data to identify self-evacuation patterns and trends while ensuring the accuracy of its data. The agency also asserted that it would review onboard communications after incidents with self-evacuation that significantly impacted the resumption of service. Additionally, NYC Transit stated that it reinstructed personnel regarding the roles of train operators and conductors in making announcements. Concerning the remaining two recommendations, the agency stated that it will assess its passenger education efforts and onboard announcement procedures to determine whether it needs to make the enhancements recommended by OIG. NYC Transit's specific responses and expected implementation dates are summarized in the Recommendations section at the end of this Report.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Self-Evacuation

NYC Transit uses the term "self-evacuation" to describe incidents in which passengers exit a train between stations without permission during an emergency or delay. This poses a serious threat to the evacuating customers, who risk being electrocuted by the third rail or struck by a moving train. Additionally, self-evacuation can hinder effective emergency response and create further delays because NYC Transit must de-energize the third rail upon receiving a report of self-evacuation, meaning that trains in that service area lose power and cannot move.

B. Onboard Communication with Riders

During a train delay, the crew members are responsible for communicating with passengers. Each subway train has two NYC Transit crew members: the train operator, who drives the train, and the conductor, who opens and closes the train doors. The train operator maintains a position in the cab at the front of the train, and the conductor is typically found in a cab in the middle of the train. Furthermore, each train has a public address (PA) system that allows the train crew to make announcements from their cab to passengers on the train. Personnel at the agency's Operations Control Center (OCC) monitor and dispatch trains and provide instructions to train crews. Both the train crews and OCC employees are in the Service Delivery Division (Service Delivery), the NYC Transit unit responsible for the day-to-day transportation operations of the subway system.

C. Event Data and Reporting

After a safety-related event or train delay of at least 20 minutes**,** NYC Transit uses its STARS system[1] to record, report, and analyze the incident; OCC superintendents prepare a STARS Report for each incident. NYC Transit can use the reports and data as it investigates incidents, analyzes trends, and identifies possible causal factors. This deeper analysis can then support the agency's efforts to improve the subway system's safety and performance and to prevent similar incidents in the future. In accordance with its practice, OCC prepared a STARS Report for the January 4, 2024 incident.

[1] Statistical Transportation Analysis and Reporting System.

D. Overview of January 4, 2024 Incident

On January 4, 2024, a northbound No. 1 train (the "incident No. 1 train") collided with a no-passenger train and derailed just north of the 96th Street Station in Manhattan. (See Figure 1, below.) Because the last car of the incident No. 1 train was still adjacent to the station platform, passengers from the rear five cars could exit to the platform. However, a jammed door between the fifth and sixth cars prevented passengers from the front half of the train from exiting via that route.

Figure 1: Illustration of the Collision Location

(Based on figure created by the Federal Transit Administration)



The incident also caused two other revenue service trains (a No. 3 train and a No. 2 train) behind the incident No. 1 train to become stuck between stations. (See Figure 2.) OIG learned that some passengers from all three trains in revenue service self-evacuated onto the tracks.[2]

Figure 2: Relative Locations of the Trains Directly Involved



[2] The no-passenger train carried several NYC Transit workers but was not in revenue service and was carrying no customers.

E. Post-Collision Timeline for January 4, 2024 Incident

The following timeline was developed by OIG auditors based on official NYC Transit radio recordings and the STARS Report. It shows agency personnel's efforts to determine who was on the tracks, whether those individuals were safe, and whether trains could move without endangering those individuals further.

- 2:59 p.m. The train operator on the no-passenger train reports that his train has just collided with another train.
- 3:12 p.m. A Track supervisor located north of the 96th Street Station near the trains that collided reports to OCC that he sees passengers walking on the roadbed. Also at this time, OCC starts to direct nearby train crews to make the first announcement to passengers stating that trains are experiencing major delays.
- 3:13 p.m. Someone from the incident No. 1 train (probably the conductor) tells OCC that passengers are being discharged to the platform from the back of the train.[3]
- 3:15 p.m. NYC Police Department (NYPD) officers attempt to gather the customers who had self-evacuated onto the roadbed from the incident No. 1 train that was hit.
- 3:18 p.m. In response to a question from OCC, the crew of the No. 3 train states that they could not move the train into the 96th Street Station to discharge their passengers because there were people on the roadbed.
- 3:27 p.m. The train operator of the incident No. 1 train tells OCC that approximately 300 passengers from the rear of the train had been discharged onto the platform. Meanwhile, NYC Fire Department (FDNY) personnel were able to open the damaged door between the train's cars. The passengers from the front of the incident No. 1 train are now being discharged to the platform through the no-passenger train that had hit this train.
- 3:32 p.m.
  - (1) OCC receives confirmation that all appropriate announcements were made on the No. 3 train.
  - (2) The conductor from the No. 3 train says passengers are self-evacuating. OCC tells her to make announcements to keep the passengers calm.
- 3:38 p.m. Again, a train crew member from the No. 3 train says that passengers are self-evacuating. OCC tells them to do their best to keep passengers on the train.

[3] In a "discharge," the passengers move directly from the train onto the platform. In an "evacuation," the passengers leave their train to move through a rescue train, step onto the concrete bench wall, or lower themselves to the track bed.

- 3:40 p.m. The train operator of the No. 2 train says that passengers are self-evacuating.
- 3:45 p.m. Someone says there are more passengers self-evacuating, and OCC tells them to keep making announcements. (It is not clear which train this is.)
- 3:48 p.m. An on-scene General Superintendent says he is in the first car of the incident No. 1 train and FDNY personnel think it will take another 30 minutes to evacuate the remaining passengers.
- 3:53 p.m. A different on-scene General Superintendent and two Superintendents confirm that they do not see any customers on the roadbed near the No. 3 train. At this point, since no passengers still appear to be on the nearby roadbed, the train operator of the No. 3 train is allowed to coast into the 96th Street Station and discharge the passengers to the platform.
- 4:15 p.m. Passengers on the incident No. 1 train finish discharging.
- 4:25 p.m. Passengers on the No. 2 train are evacuating to another train (the rescue train) via an emergency bridging device.
- 4:50 p.m. Passengers from the No. 2 train finish exiting from the rescue train onto the platform.

III. FINDINGS

A. Self-Evacuation is a Persistent Issue

After learning that passengers self-evacuated from three separate trains following the collision on January 4, OIG sought to understand the scale of the problem and identify trends in self-evacuation over time. Self-evacuation not only poses a danger to customers but can also disrupt subway service and delay efforts to evacuate passengers from the subway system in an emergency. Therefore, it could be helpful to understand how frequently self-evacuation occurs and identify patterns that might shed light on any factors that increase the likelihood of passengers deciding to self-evacuate.

OIG auditors spoke to Service Delivery employees, including train crew members and OCC personnel. When asked about the frequency of self-evacuations, multiple Service Delivery personnel stated that they believed there had been an increasing number of incidents in which passengers self-evacuate during delays, particularly since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020.

To research the frequency of these events, OIG reviewed STARS Reports for mentions of self-evacuation and found 46 incidents from January 2015 through December 2024. As Figure 3 illustrates, the analysis revealed that from 2018 to 2024, between four and eight incidents occurred each year in which passengers from at least one train self-evacuated.

Figure 3: Incidents with Passenger Self-Evacuation, by Year



OIG also found that passengers who self-evacuated often left their train soon after the delay began. In 42 of the 46 incidents analyzed, OIG was able to determine the amount of time that had elapsed between the start of the delay or safety event and the first reports of self-evacuation. As Figure 4 shows, in almost half of those incidents – 43% of the time – passengers began to self-evacuate within 30 minutes of the start of the delay, and 71% of the time within 40 minutes. In three incidents (7%), self-evacuations occurred in the first nine minutes, and the shortest interval before passengers began to self-evacuate was a mere *two minutes*.

Figure 4: Elapsed Time from Start of Incident to Start of Self-Evacuation
(42 Incidents, January 2015 to December 2024)



The fact that passengers began to self-evacuate so quickly makes it clear that NYC Transit faces a significant challenge in preventing self-evacuation because personnel have a limited window of opportunity to prevent the behavior.

B. Self-Evacuations Increased Delays for the Other Passengers

OIG's analysis of the STARS data revealed that in many cases, self-evacuation caused further delays and disruption; in some events, the presence of individuals on the track bed prevented NYC Transit personnel from discharging passengers from a train. Below are three examples that demonstrate how self-evacuation can complicate NYC Transit's efforts to respond to incidents effectively and resolve them as quickly and safely as possible.

Case Study # 1 – December 23, 2020

Signal problems at Roosevelt Island Station forced trains on the F line to halt service in both directions. After an initial delay of approximately 50 minutes, a train that was stuck between stations was instructed to move into a station so passengers could be discharged to the platform. However, before the train crew could carry out this

instruction, multiple passengers self-evacuated from the train. After learning of the self-evacuation, OCC directed personnel to shut off the third rail power and to check the tracks for customers. As a result of the self-evacuation, power was removed for approximately **56 minutes**, significantly delaying the discharge of passengers from the train.

Case Study # 2 – August 22, 2022

After a No. 5 train struck an unauthorized individual on the roadbed, the train operator placed the train's brakes into emergency mode. OCC ordered all nearby trains to stop and directed personnel to shut off the third rail power. Approximately 34 minutes after the initial incident, a train operator on a No. 6 train reported seeing three individuals on the roadbed who appeared to have self-evacuated from one of the delayed trains. This prevented NYC Transit from re-energizing the tracks and further delayed trains along the line. Only after the customers who self-evacuated were confirmed to be off the roadbed were trains able to proceed again. **Thirty minutes** had elapsed after the first reports of customers on the roadbed.

Case Study # 3 – January 4, 2024

As described above, the derailment of a No. 1 train on January 4 caused a No. 3 train to become stuck just south of the 96th Street Station. At 3:18 p.m., the crew on the No. 3 train reported to OCC that they could not proceed to the platform because individuals had been seen on the roadbed. NYC Transit personnel did not confirm that the roadbed was clear until 3:54 p.m., meaning the discharge of passengers from the No. 3 train was delayed by **at least 36 minutes** because of self-evacuation.

C. Analysis of Incident Data Can Inform Strategies to Reduce Self-Evacuations

OIG found that NYC Transit does not use its internal data, such as STARS Reports, to monitor and conduct regular analysis of self-evacuation patterns and trends. This represents a missed opportunity for the agency and limits NYC Transit's ability to prevent and respond to self-evacuation more effectively. OIG's analysis of STARS Reports revealed some trends that could inform NYC Transit's understanding of this behavior. For example, a large portion of the 46 incidents involving self-evacuation during 2015 to 2024 occurred on certain line groups. Specifically, as Figure 5 shows, 25 (54%) of the incidents occurred on two line groups, the 4/5/6 and A/C/E.[4]

[4] The difference between the 54% and the sum of the chart numbers (33% plus 22%) is due to rounding.

Figure 5: Self-Evacuation Incidents by Line Group
(January 2015 – December 2024)

Line Group	No. of Self-Evacuation Incidents	*Percent of Total*[5]
4 5 6	15	*33%*
A C E	10	*22%*
1 2 3	7	*15%*
N Q R W	4	*9%*
L	3	*7%*
J Z	3	*7%*
B D F M	3	*7%*
7	1	*2%*
Grand Total	**46**	***100%***

As an example of how STARS data on self-evacuation could support additional research and provide new insights, OIG's analysis revealed that in 2023, service on the 4/5/6 line group represented about 17% of the total amount of subway service and 17% of STARS incidents of all types.[6] However, these lines had 33% of the incidents involving self-evacuation during the period of OIG's analysis. Similarly, the A/C/E represented around 12% of the total amount of service and 17% of all STARS incidents in 2023, but had 22% of the incidents involving self-evacuation in OIG's analysis. This reveals that some lines have experienced disproportionate instances of self-evacuation relative to their share of train service. Passengers on these lines might particularly benefit from an increased agency effort to prevent self-evacuation, and OCC personnel could use such analyses to monitor the effectiveness of these efforts.

D. NYC Transit Could Combat Self-Evacuations with Educational Outreach

NYC Transit has implemented practices designed to dissuade passengers from self-evacuating, but they could be expanded. Currently, "Emergency Instructions" signs are posted on trains warning passengers not to "exit [the] train unless directed to do so by [the] train crew or emergency workers." In addition, an MTA webpage titled "Incident and emergency preparedness at the MTA" informs customers of the dangers of self-evacuation. This webpage

[5] Due to rounding, the percentages in this column do not add up to 100%.
[6] OIG determined the levels of train service by using the 2023 MTA data on the number of train trips on each line and the percentages of STARS incidents based on system data for 2023.

specifically lists track electrification and the possibility of moving trains as two of the dangers of self-evacuation. Although this webpage provides good information to customers, it is unlikely that many of them see the information because it is not prominently displayed, limiting its effectiveness.

OIG encourages NYC Transit to employ all the available tools to expand its customer education efforts on the dangers of self-evacuation. In particular, NYC Transit could try using additional means, such as onboard advertising, regular station and train announcements, a social media campaign, and press releases on the personal risks and passenger delays that could result when people decide to exit a train without assistance from subway personnel and first responders. In addition, NYC Transit might consider focusing more educational efforts on the subway lines that have historically had a disproportionate number of self-evacuation events, as noted above.

E. Expectations for Train Crews' Onboard Announcements Could be Clearer

Train crews play a crucial role in ensuring passengers' safety and comfort during emergencies and extended delays. For instance, passengers who were on trains delayed by the explosion of a Con Edison substation on December 11, 2024, credited their conductors with keeping people calm during the lengthy wait aboard hot trains. Service Delivery has established protocols to encourage effective communication with passengers during emergencies and extended delays through its Policy 10.32.4 (*Procedures for Response to Rapid Transit Emergencies*, issued in 2009) and two subsequent bulletins: Bulletin 12-21 (issued in 2021) and Bulletin 142-22 (issued in 2022). These guidelines mandate that train crew members, particularly conductors, make announcements within two minutes of an emergency stop and continue to do so at regular intervals thereafter. This systematic approach is designed to keep passengers informed and alleviate anxiety during stressful situations.

When a delay exceeds 10 minutes, the conductor is instructed to traverse the length of the train, providing information about the cause and anticipated duration of the delay. This face-to-face interaction is critical, allowing the conductor to determine whether passengers heard the initial announcements and to reinforce safety messages.

1. The Substance of Onboard Announcements

NYC Transit developed Bulletin 12-21 in response to the December 2020 incident on the F line, described above in Case Study # 1, during which multiple passengers self-evacuated from a train. The bulletin underscores the necessity of keeping passengers calm and informed to mitigate the risk of self-evacuation. It stipulates that during prolonged delays, the conductor must make public address announcements advising passengers to remain on the train for their own safety. The conductor is also required to reiterate this crucial message while moving through the train.

While the conductor is away from their cab, the train operator is responsible for making delay announcements. The standard announcement to be delivered includes, "Attention Passengers: This is your conductor/train operator. Emergency personnel are aware that our train is currently between stations and are working to resolve the issue. For your safety, please remain inside the train." This approach aims to enhance passenger safety and maintain order during emergencies.

In the case of the January 4, 2024 incident, the conductors on all three trains told OIG that they had made announcements, but the content of these messages may have differed. One conductor distinctly remembered advising passengers to stay on board, while OIG could not determine whether the conductors on the other two trains had delivered similar messages.

Furthermore, while Bulletin 12-21 emphasizes the importance of keeping passengers informed and calm, it does not include specific requirements for train crews to warn of the dangers of self-evacuation. Understanding the risks associated with abandoning the train – such as exposure to the risk of being electrocuted by the third rail or hit by a moving train – could help deter passengers from making impulsive decisions in emergencies.

2. Train Operator Required to Make Announcements

When trains are stranded between stations, it is particularly important that passengers receive clear and timely updates regarding their situation. However, during the incident on January 4, 2024, passengers in the front half of the incident No. 1 train apparently received very few announcements – or none at all. Three passengers who had been in the front half of the train told OIG that they could not recall hearing any communication, either via the PA system or from the conductor in person, during the delay of at least 28 minutes.[7] This apparent lapse raises concerns about the effectiveness of NYC Transit's announcement protocols.

The conductor on the incident No. 1 train told OIG that he had made one or two announcements immediately after the collision. He then moved to the back of the train to assist with evacuations, thereby leaving passengers in the front half of the train without updates. OIG learned from the train operator, who was responsible for communicating with passengers when the conductor was not available to do so, that he did not issue any PA announcements during the emergency. Instead, he told OIG that he only spoke to passengers once, while walking through the front half of the train to address an issue with the brakes after the collision. According to the train operator, during his walkthrough, he tried to keep the customers calm and, when he saw some children wanting to exit the train, he told them not to do so. However, he did not provide periodic updates on the conditions caused by the collision or generally announce that passengers should remain on the train.

The fact that the train operator did not make PA announcements is not surprising. Service Delivery personnel were not fully aware of the requirements for train operators to make announcements during emergencies, particularly when the conductor is unavailable. Although multiple Service Delivery personnel, including train crew members and managers, told OIG that they believed a train operator *should* make announcements when the conductor is unable to do so, none of them believed that train operators were *required* to make announcements in those situations. However, Bulletin 12-21 clearly states that train operators are required to make announcements in such situations. In fact, the head of Service Delivery's Operating Policy and Procedures unit confirmed OIG's understanding of this requirement and stated that the requirement is still in force.

[7] As shown in the incident timeline above, the collision occurred on or about 2:59 p.m.. The passengers in the front half of the No. 1 train started to evacuate at around 3:27 p.m. (28 minutes later). The last passengers on this train started to evacuate around 3:48 p.m. (49 minutes later) and were all off the train by 4:15 p.m..

It should be noted that NYC Transit's post-incident review did not cover onboard communications after the January 4, 2024 incident. This would have been a good opportunity for a lessons-learned review to be conducted on how such communications could be improved, including ensuring that the proper personnel make the best possible announcements so that passengers are informed, less anxious, and hopefully less likely to self-evacuate.

F. The Accuracy of STARS Data Needs to be Improved

To analyze self-evacuation behavior and seek solutions to this challenge, NYC Transit needs accurate data in a format that can be readily analyzed. However, OIG found that to correctly identify incidents when self-evacuations had occurred, auditors needed to review STARS Reports individually because the data was unreliable.[8]

Each STARS Report lists relevant "trouble causes" with a specific numeric code and label, one of which is self-evacuation. However, OIG found 24 STARS Reports covering 2015 to 2024 that described self-evacuation events but lacked the self-evacuation trouble code.

Moreover, OIG found nine reports that listed self-evacuation as a trouble cause but did not describe an instance of self-evacuation. Five of those nine described train delays or safety incidents when no self-evacuation occurred, while the other four reports described events when NYC Transit employees had evacuated from buildings. OIG confirmed with Service Delivery personnel that these nine cases had been mislabeled. Ensuring that STARS Reports are correctly characterized with the appropriate trouble causes will help NYC Transit identify and analyze patterns and trends in self-evacuation.

[8] OIG conducted an automated search of the STARS data to find reports that included the term "self-evac" or "self evac." Auditors read each report identified to determine whether a self-evacuation had actually occurred and thus whether the report was properly labeled.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

OIG recognizes that NYC Transit is faced with a problem that is not of the agency's own making, but which – like subway surfing and fare evasion – involves customers' poor decision-making and behavior. While behavioral issues are very difficult to address effectively, NYC Transit cannot ignore them.

OIG makes the following recommendations in support of the agency's efforts to address the challenges of self-evacuations and to keep passengers as informed as possible.

NYC Transit should:

1. Implement a campaign to raise awareness of the dangers of self-evacuation. Consider starting with efforts on the line groups where these events occur most frequently (4/5/6 and A/C/E).

   Agency Response: NYC Transit stated that it "currently has messaging directed at the dangers of entering the subway roadbed and the importance of following instructions of NYC Transit employees during emergencies. [NYC Transit] will conduct a review of [its] current communications, including signs, train and station announcements, social media, advertising and press releases to assess whether the messaging requires enhancement to address the dangers of self-evacuation. This review and assessment will be completed by end of Q3 2025."

2. Establish a process to analyze STARS Report data regularly to identify self-evacuation patterns or trends that could inform ongoing outreach and education efforts.

   Agency Response: NYC Transit accepted this recommendation. The agency stated that it "will establish a process to analyze STARS report data to identify self-evacuation patterns or trends ... by the end of Q3 2025."

3. Expand the language required in onboard announcements during delays and emergencies to include the potential dangers and consequences of self-evacuations. NYC Transit should consider using relevant language that is currently on the agency's website.

Agency Response: NYC Transit asserted that it "has procedures in place that outline the appropriate announcements to be made during emergencies or extended delays, which includes informing passengers that they should remain onboard the train for their safety. That being said, NYC Transit will review its procedures and assess whether this language should be expanded to include additional information about the potential dangers and consequences of self-evacuation by end of Q2 2025."

4. Reinstruct Service Delivery managers, including OCC staff, and train crew members on the requirement for train operators to make announcements if the conductor is unable to do so during emergencies or major delays.

   Agency Response: NYC Transit accepted this recommendation. The agency informed OIG that it "implemented this recommendation by issuing Bulletin 47-25 - Delay Announcements on March 19, 2025, emphasizing the requirement that train operators must make delay announcements when conductors are unable to do so during emergencies or major delays."

5. Conduct a lessons-learned review of onboard communications for incidents where passenger self-evacuations significantly impact a resumption of service.

   Agency Response: NYC Transit accepted this recommendation. It stated that "any post incident investigation of a significant occurrence will include a review of onboard communications when the underlying incident resulted in passenger self-evacuation that significantly impacted the resumption of service."

6. Reinstruct OCC personnel regarding the proper recording of the self-evacuation code for train incident reports.

   Agency Response: NYC Transit accepted this recommendation. The agency stated that it "will reinstruct OCC personnel regarding the proper use of the self-evacuation code as a secondary trouble code when self-evacuation is an outcome of a delay incident by the end of Q3 2025."